Success in Iraq

On Monday, I posted about the elections in Afghanistan, an historic occurrence that you probably didn't hear much about.

Here, I'd like to look at the successes in Iraq you haven't been hearing much about, if anything.

Much information is available, and accessible to you, but the MSM is not doing the task of collating it all and presenting it to you. This is something the blogosphere excels at, and indeed, Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail blog has been doing tremendous work tracking US military operations in western Iraq.

For example, Roggio has been following the operations in the Anbar Province and Tal Afar. These operations have been joint efforts between the US military and Iraqi forces.

This graphic (via Belmont Club) illustrates the location of various operations. In commenting on this graphic, Belmont Club highlights the various operations involved.

One of the main goals of these operations is to put pressure on the rat lines that run from Syria to Baghdad. US and Iraqi forces seek to interdict supplies, money and reinforcements traveling these routes. From the graphic, you'll see two main lines follow the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and towns along those rivers.

What are these successes?

Here is a DoD press briefing given by Army Col. McMaster, commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. It is well worth reading, for it gives a lot of information on successes in Tal Afar, and important town between Mosul and Syria.

Belmont Club comments on the briefing here. Wretchard writes:

Several things stand out. The first is that despite the enemy's use of IEDs, snipers, mortar teams, boob-trapped buildings and the fortification of a dense urban area, Coalition forces swept through it like #$#@ through a goose. And this appears to be due, in part, to a creative form of battlefield shaping founded on unspecified and better sources of human and technical intelligence. Enemy delaying actions did not work. Attempts to evade and relocate did not work. Traps were sprung. Fighters trying to blend into the crowd were found. The enemy decided to defend its remaining enclaves in the city because they were out of moves.

Dan Darling at Winds of Change comments here and here. Darling writes:

Given what a gold-mine of information this is, I'm quite surprised more notice hasn't been paid to it, particularly given how potentially volatile an area Mosul is. Wonder why that could be...

One thing you haven't heard much about is the vast improvement of the Iraqi forces. They have performed well in these operations. A year ago, Iraqi forces were, shall we say, inept. They were famous for their "spray and pray" approach to the firing their weapons. US instructors have worked to teach them fire discipline. A person I talked to a year ago said an Iraqi soldier took three shots at a target, missed wildly, and said "Something must be wrong with the gun". This US instructor took the gun, put three rounds in the target, handed it back, and said "It's not the gun". Iraqi forces have come a long way, but most Americans don't know about the progress that's been made.

In this 9/17 post, Roggio writes:

Coalition forces captured Abu Fatima al Qaeda's latest commander of Mosul, as well as Abu Shahed, one of the organizations commanders during a meeting. Fatima was the organizations' leader for only 12 days prior to his capture. The Emir of Mosul for al Qaeda has been a tough position to hold.

This link tells of some terrorists apprehended in Mosul.

Chester has an excellent, and somewhat humorous, look at these various captures, and other successes.

These captures indicate excellent intelligence, and the ability to operate in these places. The fact Abu Fatima only lasted 12 days before getting captured is not sheer luck.

US and Iraqi forces have made tremendous progress in northern and western Iraq, yet our media has been virtually silent on these successes. The awful bombings in Baghdad get vast attention, just as the terrorists want. Certainly, we ought to pay attention to these bloody bombings, as they illustrate the nature of the enemy, but let's not overlook the fact the terrorists are under great pressure.

There is a lot of reading here, I know. I haven't included nearly all the details contained within. But it is worth keeping up with. In particular, follow The Fourth Rail, and dig back through past posts there. There is a ton of information there explaining operations in the last few weeks.

Let me finish with this. In this letter, a terrorist writes to Zarqawi to complain about the deteriorating situation. This terrorist, Abu Zayd explains the pressure they are under.

Abu Zayd informs in his letter to the "Sheikh" that, "This is a clarification of what has become of the situation in Mosul, and it is no secret to you the noticeable decrease in the attacks carried out by the Mujahidin, from not long ago when Mosul was in the hands of the Mujahidin…" Abu Zayd continues by listing the multiple reasons why the "Mujahidin" have been less effective recently.

Abu Zayd claims that the Mosul Emirs are incompetent; attacks lack diversity; suicide bombings are focused more on quantity and not quality; those who are in the network are disobedient; a legitimate organization in Mosul does not exist; collaboration between the Emirs is lacking; "Muslim money" is squandered on petty expenses; numerous security violations occur; "inaccurate and blurred" updates to the Sheikh are reported; and foreign fighters endure "deplorable" conditions to include lack of pay, housing problems and marginalization.

This pressure is a direct result of US and Iraqi action.

As Roggio writes here, Zayd was later killed, and replaced with a driver. That's how much pressure the terrorists are under. Their competent people are being killed off, and they are reaching to the bottom of the barrel.

Today, Multinational Forces-Iraq stated that three more senior al Qaeda commanders in the Mosul region have been detained, based on intelligence from local Iraqi citizens. Captured were Abu Muhammad, “a terrorist battalion commander for Al-Qaeda in Iraq in Mosul”; Abu Shayma, “a cell leader under Abu Muhammad”; and Abu Abd al Karim. Karim was the driver for the recently killed Abu Zayd, the former Emir of al Qaeda in Mosul, who succeeded Abu Talha (the commander of Ansar al-Islam prior to its official merger with al Qaeda), after he was captured by the Coalition. The succession is dizzying.

Celebrate our amazing military!