Peace Like A River


It was a wide river, mistakable for a lake or even an ocean unless you'd been wading and knew its current. Somehow I'd crossed it... Now I saw the stream regrouped below, flowing on through what might've been vineyards, pastures, orhards... It flowed between and alongside the rivers of people; from here it was no more than a silver wire winding toward the city. - Leif Enger, Peace Like A River

Sunday, October 02, 2005

Progress in Iraq

On Sept, 30, Gen. Casey, commander of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, appeared with Secretary Rumsfeld at a Pentagon briefing.

Rumsfeld began by looking at the war from the terrorists perspective:

For example, they might be asked why they failed to stop millions of Afghans and Iraqis from voting in free and relatively orderly elections. Or how is it that the Iraqi Sunnis, who are supposedly the natural allies of the insurgents, have chosen, albeit belatedly, to energetically embrace the political process, registering in large numbers. Or why the terrorists failed to prevent nearly 200,000 and some 75,000 Afghans -- 200,000 Iraqis and some 75,000 Afghanis -- I think it's technically 194,000 Iraqis -- from joining the Afghan and Iraqi security forces, despite their very best efforts at intimidation to prevent them from joining those forces. Or why the vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis have rejected the terrorists' twisted ideology and, instead, are supporting efforts to build new societies. Or how terrorists expect to succeed militarily when they cannot rely on sanctuaries in places like Fallujah or Najaf or Tall Afar to plan operations and to train recruits.

These would be awkward questions for them to answer, indeed, because by every one of those measurements, the enemy is losing. Though the transition of Afghan [sic] and Iraq from tyranny to democracy has been and remains violent, we know the importance of seeing this effort through, and we're seeing the progress that has come with patience, the patience, the adaptability, the resilience and the grit of our armed forces.

Consider four years ago these two countries were among a handful of regimes in the world that were labeled as terrorist sponsors, regimes that had the viciousness and the capability to support terrorism and inflict damage on our country. And today these two countries are joining a growing list of free nations that are fighting terrorism. And millions of their neighbors have taken notice of the reforms that are under way in these rising and predominantly Muslim democracies. These are important achievements.


Gen. Casey continued, looking at encouraging signs in Iraq.

On the military side, coalition forces and Iraqi security forces continue to pressure terrorists and insurgents across Iraq. And Iraqi security forces are progressing and continuing to take a more prominent role in defending their country.

Let me give you an example of what I'm talking about. In May, Iraqi security forces conducted about 160 combined or independent operations at the company level and above, so about 100 people as company level, and about 160 operations. In September, that was over 1,300, and then our transition teams that we have put with the Iraqi security forces have greatly enhanced their development and their ability to operate with us. We are at the point now where 80 percent of all of the company-level and higher operations that are done are combined operations with the Iraqi or Iraqi independent operations -- big step forward.

Additionally, we expect to have 60[000] to 70,000 more Iraqi security forces available for referendum security than we had in January, and by the time of the elections, we expect to have about 100,000 more Iraqi security forces available to protect those elections than we had in January. So as a result, for example, I only had to ask for an additional 2,000 coalition troops to protect the referendum and election process this year vice 12,000 in January.

Another example, in the recent success in Tall Afar, Iraqi security forces outnumbered coalition forces for the first time in a major operation. A year ago that division didn't exist. We've also had good success militarily against the al Qaeda network killing and capturing over 20 of their key leaders since July and including the recent death of a key Zarqawi lieutenant, Abu Azzam.


A reporter asked about a recent report that the number of Iraqi battalions capable of operating with US help fell from 3 to 1. Casey answered:

Charlie, think about what you're saying; two battalions out of a hundred. One thing. Second, let me explain here the different levels and why we set them up like we did.

First of all, we purposely set a very high standard for the first level, because as we looked at our strategy, we said that whatever happens with the Iraqi security forces, when we leave them, we have to leave them at a level where they can sustain the counterinsurgency effort with progressively less support from us. So that first one is a very, very high standard. We set that standard knowing full well that it was going to be a long time before all Iraqi units got in that category. And so the fact that there's only one or three units, that is not necessarily important to me right now. Next year at this time, I'll be much more concerned about it. Right now I'm not.

Second thing, level two. And this is -- this, for us right now is the most important level, because we purposely adopted a level that would allow us to measure their capability to take the lead in conducting counterinsurgency operations, with our support, with our transition teams and enablers. And again, while these numbers are classified, the numbers of units in level two have doubled since May. So that's where we should be focusing our attention at this point.

Level three are those units that are not quite at level two, but they are also in the fight with us. And I think you've heard that said; over 75 percent of these Iraqi units are out there with us in the fight every day. They're just -- some are leading; some are operating with us. Okay?

So, you asked me, is it a setback, and I say no, it's not a setback. I mean, unit readiness is going to fluctuate. And it is such a small number, and at this stage I'm not concerned about small numbers in level one.


Translation: Right now, Iraqi units are not capable of operating without US help. Part of that, I imagine, would involve logistics and supplies, and Iraqi units probably can't supply themselves yet.

But, Casey says real progress is being made in getting Iraqi units to level 2. And indeed, as I've talked about here, Iraqi forces have made significant progress in their ability to conduct security operations alongside the US.

Rumsfeld added this:

We could keep doing this. What's important is -- the central fact is that the one and three are irrelevant. What's important is that every day the number of Iraqi security forces are getting bigger, and they're getting better, and they're getting more experienced. And General Casey can tell you they are doing more. They are literally out there -- I don't know if the number's still right, but at one point we thought that they were doing about -- that U.S. was doing about 80 percent of the patrols and the activity, and the Iraqi security forces about 20 [percent]. And today it's probably roughly reversed, that the Iraqi -- independent and Iraqi combined are probably 80 percent, and maybe 20 percent are U.S.-coalition only.


Bottom line, Iraqi forces are improving, let's acknowledge the improvement that has been made. The trends are in the right direction.

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Major K. has an excellent explanation of what is meant by combat readiness.

1 Comments:

  • At Mon Oct 03, 09:04:00 AM, Anonymous said…

    I agree with most of those assessments from the ground where its actually happening(although I dont see everything of course. I only have my small window and information).
    Then again, perhapsy you caught me at a good time? I just got back a few minutes ago, working with some of those very same guys(iraqis)on the ground who are the future of this countrys security and our ticket outa here(by that, realistically, a major US troop drawdown, dont be fooled we-read USA and the taxpayer-are here to stya in some capacity for a very long time. probably until the oil runs out. just calling a spade a spade)
    Some other days, I think, do these guys have a chance? Not so much I muse. But thats the reality of being IN the issue. I have no third person perspective to allow a less biased observation.
    Regardless of personal mood and the weekly ups and downs inherent in these types of war, real and measured progress has been made. Digging into those numbers and statistics does raise some serious questions, I dont disagree one bit.
    Some of those numbers mean "what" to me, I would ask.
    Take for instance, trained and equiped. Well, if the soldiers havent pawned off their US issued guns and gear(it happens)or lost it or broke it...and if there minimal basic training(most enlisted-except for some to most officers-do not get a level of basic US/NATO military training that I would argue is necessary. But really, in the present circumstance, we have to accept some level of shake and bake training to get these guys out on the streets, there really is little other choice. Later on, more and better training across the board can and will be implemented) where was I?...
    they might be able to conduct WITH a US military unit or other country a modern standard of military patrol or combat op.
    Without all of the background info, I can certainly see why most reporters and public is confused over these generals press statements.
    I dont believe they have emphasized this but I am sure at least some press release or military analyst has stated in the news as long ago as a year that:
    it is/was going to take at least 3 to 5 years(MINIMUM) to bring the Iraqi army and security forces up to a level of competance approaching acceptable first world nation status. Most 3rd nation armies are really good at suppressing internal dissent-it doesnt take much skill to beat down unarmed dissidents using tanks and machine guns-but they have little chance against a professional modern army(see this invasion. We took down a country in a few weeks. thats amazing. Caveat. us army good at what it does. fight a conventional war. not so good at fighting an insurgency(except for SF but big army doesnt want to listen to those guys) and building a nation-which I might add, before this war we had neither been TRAINED or been EQUIPPED to do so we had to make do on the fly (like we always do when tasked with the impossible and improbable) when given the mission. So I would say we have done quite well with whats been given in this relatively short amount of time)
    Here is a for instance; saddam era army. Beatings, graft, corruption, nepotism, brutal tactics etc and they get what they need accomplished.
    Nowadays, with USA looking at them, they have to play by a modern rule book.(will they stick to it once we leave? hmm)
    All of that takes time. If you take any US squad of 40 guys, with a leautenant a few sergeants and bunch of privates you could tell them to do pretty much any task, sky the limit.(grab 40 US civilians and give them a task. chances are it might be a bit chaotic for awhile. thats the genius of our system. I have explained this many other militarys of different countries. Right down to most of our privates, we can take the fight down to the last man. Not so in Iraq and many other places. You take out a few officers and they collapse.) Order squad to: Take down a building, attack an enemy unit, rebuild X and Y, do this or that, etc. Tell them, forget about it and you assume it will get done to standard without major war crimes and accidents and mistakes.
    Not so with an most Iraqi units. Chaos confusion incompetance etc rule the day alot of times. Things go much slower. They are learning. They improve over time. Many former military soldiers help this transition.
    You cannot just create an intact functioning army in 1 or 2 years. (big us mistake, we didnt really start doing it seriously until oif2, oif 1 was really a wasted year)
    For various reasons, these battalions flucuate in ability and readiness. Officers are fired for incompetance, graft, corruption, treason/traitor/sedtion acts. Many other sundry events take place like combat casualties(the Iraqi army has had thousands killed in this war, much more than US or other countries) or other matters that occur to change a units status.
    In short, If you were to just throw out many of these Iraqi units out into the wind and see what happens you would get a big mess. The big plan right now with the military handover is working fairly well despite the challenges. Key issues remain, like the militias roaming uncontrolled and sectarian divides arising in the military units.
    For the political side?...thats an entirely different issue.

     

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