India and Iran

The severity of a crisis is always reflected in the difficulty nations have in getting their allies, or potential allies, to commit to a position. The higher the stakes, the more nations caught in the middle on an issue try to avoid having to make defining decisions.

India is in such a position with the growing confrontation over Iran's nuclear program. With the United States, Europe and the United Nations on one side, and Iran on the other, and its own internal politics playing a significant role, India is facing a bit of a Hobson's choice. Should India back a UN motion against Iran?

The difficulty India has is directly related to an agreement reached with the United States last July. The United States agreed to provide strong assistance to India in its civilian nuclear program, lifting sanctions that went back to India's nuclear testing in 1998. In return, India will keep its civilian and nuclear programs very separate, and will allow IAEA access. From the State Dept:

India will assume the same responsibilities and practices as other countries with advanced nuclear programs, and has agreed to:

* Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs and file an IAEA declaration regarding its civilian facilities;

* Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;

* Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;

* Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;

* Work with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty;

* Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread;

* Secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The deal is of great importance to India because it wants to be recognized as a nuclear power, and it wants to develop its civilian nuclear program to meet its growing energy needs.

However, the agreement still needs to be approved by Congress, and therein lies the sticking point.

Last September, at an IAEA meeting, India backed a resolution declaring Iran was in non-compliance with its agreement with the IAEA. This brought with it the threat of a referral to the UN, and it was an uncomfortable vote for India. As this editorial said:

India's representatives in the [September 2005 meeting] voted for a Bush-backed resolution accusing Iran of alarming but unproven nuclear "non-compliance" and threatening implicitly a referral of the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution reminded an apprehensive world public of the ground Washington had prepared for its war on Iraq, launched in grave violation of international law and norms.

By its vote, New Delhi made India's most serious departure from the country's traditional policy of non-alignment and distanced the country from most of the developing world. The vote elicited wide protests in India, especially from the Left, which supports the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from outside as the only alternative to the far Right regime rejected by the people in the last parliamentary elections.

Two recent public statements warrant pessimism about India's performance in Vienna next week. On November 14 came a statement on the subject from US ambassador to India David C. Mulford. Asked about the role he expected from India, he said: "India will assess its national interest and act accordingly." It must be recalled that Mulford had earlier noted that India's vote in September had also been dictated by "its national interest."

On November 16 came a striking endorsement from none other than India's foreign secretary, Shyam Saran. The mandarin with the most important part to play in the affair also asserted that India's role in the IAEA will be "in accordance with our national interest."

Both Saran and Mulford have the same specific "national interest" in mind. It is not a closely-guarded state secret that India's first vote on Iran was a lopsidedly logical sequel to the Singh-Bush nuclear deal of July 18. The vote was New Delhi's way of saying thanks for the deal which, in its view, took India right to the door of the nuclear club. Washington, which had already lifted all its other sanctions imposed against India after its nuclear weapons tests, now recognized the country as a "responsible" nuclear-weapon state and was ready to reward it with a civilian nuclear bonanza.

On Wednesday, the US Ambassador to India, David Mulford, spoke rather plainly, especially for a diplomat. According to the BBC:

Mr Mulford told the Press Trust of India (PTI) news agency on Wednesday that the US was keen to have India's support when UN atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meets to discuss Iran.

"If [India] opposes Iran having nuclear weapons, we think they should record it in the vote."

India's failure to do so, he said, would have a "devastating" effect on US Congress members who have yet to approve the nuclear deal.

"I think the initiative will die in the Congress. Not because the administration would want it to, but the Congress will... so I think this is part of the calculation that India has to keep in mind," Mr Mulford said.

The direct attempt to link Congressional approval on the July 2005 agreement and India's vote on Iran did not go over well in India.

This came up in the daily State Dept press briefing Wednesday, and the State Dept spokesman sort of hung his guy out to dry. Mr. McCormack said Ambassador Mulford was expressing a personal opinion, and then went on to tap dance around the issue again, as diplomats are wont to do.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. I don't know if you guys covered this. The U.S. Ambassador to India is being quoted as saying that this landmark civilian nuclear program that they've agreed to would die -- in the quote -- if India does not vote against Iran at the upcoming IAEA meeting. Can you confirm that that's true?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I didn't sit in the interview so I didn't --

QUESTION: No, I don't care if the interview is true. Is the issue that if Iran -- if India votes against Iran, is that true that --

MR. MCCORMACK: If you look at the news stories that have come out on this, the various wire reports, it includes comments from Ambassador Mulford's spokesman at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. What he said is the Ambassador was expressing his personal opinions about what the potential political outcome might be. He was giving his personal assessment of how the Congress might react to such an action by India.

Let me be clear. Ultimately, how India votes on this matter is going to be a decision for the Indian Government. They voted to find Iran in noncompliance the last time around and we certainly would encourage and hope that they vote for referral this time around. But I think what the Ambassador was doing was talking about and reflecting the view that on Capitol Hill there are very strongly held feelings about Iran and the need to -- need for the international community to act decisively and firmly and with a single voice concerning Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

And we -- you know, not to go through Civics 101, but we've got three separate branches of government here. We're in the Executive Branch. And Congress and Senators and Representatives will have views of their own. And I think what Ambassador Mulford was doing was expressing an opinion about how the Congress might react, given that outcome.

QUESTION: So what is the Executive Branch's view on that as far as the understanding?

MR. MCCORMACK: Our view is that we would certainly encourage and we would hope that India would vote for a referral to the Security Council.

QUESTION: And if it doesn't?

MR. MCCORMACK: We continue to work with the Indian Government on implementation of the agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed during the Prime Minister's recent visit here. We would certainly hope that we would be in a position to -- before or as part of the President's visit to India to make progress on this issue. Part of making progress on this issue is for the Indian Government to present a workable plan that would separate the Indian civilian and military nuclear programs. We're still talking about that issue with the Indian Government and I expect that those discussions will continue.

QUESTION: And is there any relevance between progress on that issue related to their needing to give you a program and their vote at the IAEA?

MR. MCCORMACK: I think that what Ambassador Mulford was doing was offering some political analysis about how the Hill might react.

QUESTION: Right, but leaving Mulford alone, is there --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that's why we're talking about this.

QUESTION: It is but -- it is because that's where it came up. But is there any relevance between how India votes at the IAEA and how their civilian nuclear agreement with the United States proceeds?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we deal with the Indian Government on these two issues as separate issues. Certainly, they come up in the same conversations, I'll tell you that. And we continue to encourage the Indian Government to vote for referral. Ultimately, that is going to be their decision. And we also have been talking to them about the importance of making progress on their implementation plan for separating the civilian and military nuclear programs.

Today, then, there was a further attempt to make diplomatic nicey-nicey. Again from the BBC article:

Mr Mulford was summoned by India's Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, on Thursday afternoon and told that his comments were "inappropriate and not conducive to building a strong partnership between the two democracies," a foreign ministry statement said.

It said that the ambassador was informed that India's vote on any possible resolution on the Iran nuclear issue at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be determined by India's own judgement of the merits of the case.

"The ambassador expressed his sincere regrets, saying that his remarks had been taken out of context," the foreign ministry statement said.

India has rejected attempts to tie its stance on Iran to the deal with the US.

However, regardless of how much India wishes the two matters were not linked, the reality is the United States will be acutely interested in what India does over the Iran confrontation. India is squirming because in addition to its relations with the US, India has internal political opposition to siding against Iran, and India of course always has its relations with Pakistan to worry about. India's nuclear capabilities are of keen interest to Pakistan.

Also in the mix is a proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. (Russia has expressed interest in being a part of this project.) There are other factors involved, but if Iran is put under sanctions, this pipeline would very likely not go forward.

India wants to take a seat at the table along with other world powers, but these thorny matters are the price of admission. The Iran matter will be taken up at an IAEA meeting next week.

Much attention is being given to Russia and China, and rightly so. But it will be just as fascinating to see what India does in the coming weeks.