The Port of Gwadar

I've done a few posts here recently on Pakistan's province of Balochistan, and the unrest there. A Baloch independence movement is slowly gaining momentum, and the number of armed encounters between Balochs and Pakistani forces have been on the rise, especially since December 2005, when rockets were fired by separatists in the vicinity of Musharraf during a visit to Balochistan.

With its proximity to Afghanistan, and also Iran, which has also seen attacks from Sunnis in its southeastern Sistan-Balochistan province, I sense this region will grow in strategic importance. The province has natural resources, especially gas, that are important to Pakistan. An independence movement would threaten that.

There is another reason, though, why this province will continue to be a strategic location.

The port of Gwadar is a port in the southwestern corner of Balochistan. It is only 72 km from Iran. It sits just about at the point where the Gulf of Oman widens out into the Indian Ocean. Starting in about 2001, Pakistan started to develop this port as a deep-water port with the cooperation of China.

It is a port of growing importance to China. China has invested $200 million so far in this port, building up its facilities. The port will be a place where Chinese ships and submarines can dock. (A couple weeks ago, Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the next phase of the project, which will involve dredging.)

Already China has set up listening posts here, to monitor US Navy traffic in and out of the Persian Gulf.

But perhaps the chief reason China is interested in this port is oil. China view this port as a way to bring oil to China by land. China gets around 60% of its oil from the Middle East. With its proximity to the Persian Gulf, China would bring oil that short distance to Gwadar, then bring it into China by land. A land route would prevent China from having to ship the oil a much longer distance where it might be interdicted by naval forces in the event of a crisis.

Already China is working with Pakistan to improve rail and road networks connecting Gwadar to the rest of Pakistan, and on to China.

The port could bring a lot of revenue to Pakistan as trade and shipping through the port increase.

And as such, a separatist movement in Balochistan could threaten all that. Hence, Pakistan will not sit idly by. (In 2004, some Chinese engineers on the Gwadar were killed and others injured in a Baloch attack.) Railroads and pipelines going inland from Gwadar could be vulnerable to guerilla attacks, so Pakistan has a thorny security problem on its hands.

From the Baloch perspective, the port is another sign that the rest of Pakistan is just using the province, and that the province will not reap the benefits of its assets.

As I mentioned in another post, if the US so desired, it could find a friend in Balochistan if we supported this independence movement. And in turn, if a friendly Balochistan denied the use of the this port to China, and provided a base for guerillas to harrass Iran, US interests could be served. (Though, as I've mentioned, given China's investments and Pakistan's interests, Balochistan could not just deny the use of the port and expect that to be the end of it. There would be a reaction.)

However, to do so would mean opposing Musharraf, with the consequences all that implies for continued cooperation against Al Qaeda, and Pakistan's own radicals.

Keep an eye on the port of Gwadar. You will hear more about it in the coming years.